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WHERE ANGELS TREAD: GUN-FREE SCHOOL
ZONE LAWS AND AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO
BEAR ARMS
In separate opinions issued in 2008 and 2010, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
guarantees an individual right to bear arms. For as lengthy as those
opinions were, however, the justices only briefly dealt with possible limits
to that right. Both decisions provided that their holding would not
invalidate “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.”
This Comment argues that the uncertainty about the scope of the
Second Amendment right has hardly been tempered by the Court’s
limiting language and that federal and state laws criminalizing the
possession of loaded handguns within 1000 feet of schools might be in
danger. The Comment further argues that the utility of gun-free school
zone laws has been hampered and that lawmakers should consider
necessary changes in light of potential legal challenges as well as recent
legislative actions. These recommended changes would penalize the
discharge but not the possession of a handgun within 1000 feet of schools,
while they would also eliminate the requirement in current statutes that the
individual know that he is within a school zone before punishment can be
meted out.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over nine inexplicable months in 1988 and 1989, disturbed adults
armed with a various array of firearms entered schoolyards in three
1
states spanning from one coast to the other and opened fire. In their
wake, the incidents left eight elementary students dead and forty-three
people wounded and spawned a raft of unprecedented gun-control
2
measures throughout a shocked nation. Among the new laws adopted
in the first half of the 1990s were the federal Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, which established a 1000-foot perimeter around school
grounds in which it is illegal to carry a loaded weapon (barring certain
3
4
exceptions), and similar statutes that are still in place in California and
5
Illinois. In introducing legislation to create the federal law, U.S.
Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin pointed to the need to combat the
6
“growing problem . . . [of t]he proliferation of firearms in our schools.”
Senator Kohl cited the cases of Laurie Dann, who killed one eight-yearold boy and wounded five other children at a Winnetka, Illinois
7
elementary school in May 1988, and Patrick Purdy, who sprayed a
Stockton, California elementary school playground with bullets, killing

1. See Elsa Walsh, Heavy Legislative Fire Aims at Gun Sale Curbs: Schoolyard Shootings
Alarm Lawmakers, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1989, at D1.
2. See id.
3. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 § 1702(b)(2)(25), 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(25), 922(q)
(2006). This Comment involves the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 and its 1996
amendments as opposed to the similarly named Gun-Free Schools Act, which requires states
receiving federal education funds to pass laws mandating the expulsion of students in
possession of firearms on school grounds. See 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2006).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011).
5. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(1)–(1.5) (West 2010).
6. 136 CONG. REC. 1165 (1990) (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl).
7. See id.; Lisa Black & Bonnie Miller Rubin, Unshakeable Anguish: Old Wounds and
New Paths Emerge for 3 Two Decades After Dann Shooting Rampage, CHI. TRIB., May 20,
2008, § 2, at 1.
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five children and wounding thirty others in January 1998. Kohl added
to the record,
My home State, Wisconsin, is not immune from this wave of
gun violence. Last year, the Milwaukee school system expelled
more than a dozen students for weapons violations. And the
number of Milwaukee County juveniles charged with handgun
possession has doubled over the past 2 years. According to
Gerald Mourning, the director of school safety for Milwaukee,
“[K]ids who did their fighting with their fists, and perhaps
9
knives, are now settling their arguments with guns.”
Today, a little more than two decades later, these gun-control efforts
are coming under increased pressure after the Supreme Court’s recent
rulings declared that the Second Amendment protects an individual
10
right to bear arms. This battle is occurring not only in courts but in
statehouses around the nation. For example, within a couple of years of
the Court’s decisions, Louisiana and Wisconsin replaced their gun-free
11
school zone laws with more permissive versions.
The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s famous and
often-confusing words provide as follows: “A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
12
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” For years, these clauses
were interpreted by courts and legal scholars as preventing federal
13
interference with the states’ abilities to support militias. Only in recent
decades has the protection of an individual right become a matter of
14
debate. The Court finally resolved this issue on June 26, 2008, with its
8. See 136 CONG. REC. 1, 1165; Walsh, supra note 1.
9. 136 CONG. REC. 1165 (alteration in original).
10. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010); District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (noting, however, that Second Amendment should not be
read “to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation”).
11. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2 (2004 & Supp. 2011); WIS. STAT. § 948.605
(2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 35, §§ 91–96.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); United States v. Cole, 276
F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that courts had interpreted the Second
Amendment as protecting a collective right “associated with the maintenance of a regulated
militia” for the previous six decades); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 640 (1989).
14. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 13, at 640–42; Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace
Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 801, 810 (1998).
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opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, where a 5–4 majority held that
the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to have a loaded
15
handgun for self-defense. Two years and two days later, the Court
extended the Heller Court’s holding in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
ruling that the Second Amendment right to bear arms applies to the
states, thus limiting the ability of states and municipalities to regulate
16
firearm possession. But, despite the lengthy opinions issued in each
case, the Court left open many issues that relate to the constitutionality
of numerous gun-control laws. As Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, complained, “The Court has invited
future [Second Amendment] challenges by not defining the scope of the
right to bear arms, by not providing a standard of review for firearms
regulation, and by creating a list of exceptions to the newfound personal
17
Second Amendment right.”

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Emerson provides a
comprehensive round-up of the state of the law at the time of its 2001 decision. According to
the majority,
In the last few decades, courts and commentators have offered what may
fairly be characterized as three different basic interpretations of the Second
Amendment. The first is that the Second Amendment does not apply to
individuals; rather, it merely recognizes the right of a state to arm its militia.
This “states’ rights” or “collective rights” interpretation of the Second
Amendment has been embraced by several of our sister circuits. . . .
Proponents of the next model admit that the Second Amendment
recognizes some limited species of individual right. However, this supposedly
“individual” right to bear arms can only be exercised by members of a
functioning, organized state militia who bear the arms while and as a part of
actively participating in the organized militia’s activities. The “individual”
right to keep arms only applies to members of such a militia, and then only if
the federal and state governments fail to provide the firearms necessary for
such militia service. . . .
The third model is simply that the Second Amendment recognizes the
right of individuals to keep and bear arms. . . . The individual rights view has
enjoyed considerable academic endorsement, especially in the last two
decades.
270 F.3d 203, 218–20 (5th Cir. 2001). In the end, the Emerson court found the last argument
the most persuasive (supporting an individual right to bear arms) but held that the law
challenged in this case did not unconstitutionally infringe upon this right. Id. at 261.
15. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
16. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.
17. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA.
L. REV. 253, 280 (2009). Judge Wilkinson III noted that “[t]he cases filed since Heller and the
multitude of federal, state, and municipal gun control regulations threaten to suck the courts
into a quagmire.” Id.
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In sidestepping such issues, the Court has practically invited a flood
18
of litigation by politically connected and motivated parties on both
19
Indeed, on the same day as the
sides of the gun-control issue.
McDonald decision, an interest group filed a lawsuit challenging a North
Carolina law that forbids the carrying of firearms off of one’s property
20
during a declared state of emergency. Dick Heller, the same plaintiff
from the District of Columbia v. Heller case decided by the Court in
2008, filed a new lawsuit challenging the statute adopted by the District
21
of Columbia in response to the municipality’s loss before the Court.
Similarly, Chicago’s new ordinance was challenged in federal court
22
shortly after the city council voted for its adoption. A wide-ranging set
of lawsuits elsewhere have sought to overturn other gun-control laws
including a Texas law that restricts the issuance of permits for the
concealed carrying of handguns to individuals at least twenty-one years
23
of age, a Maryland law that allows firearm permits only for people with
24
a “good and substantial reason” to carry a handgun, a Georgia law

18. See Kristin Myles et al., Supreme Court Watch: Guns, Incorporated, S.F. ATT’Y, Fall
2010, at 48, 51 (describing McDonald’s legacy as “much more litigation”); Wilkinson, supra
note 17, at 288 (predicting that “now . . . the litigation will take off”).
19. See Wilkinson, supra note 17, at 301 (noting that the National Rifle Association has
over four million members, and, on the opposing side, the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence
brings together many organizations nationwide such as child welfare advocates, religious
associations, and public health professionals).
20. See Complaint at 2, 7–8, Bateman v. Perdue, No. 5:10-cv-265-H (E.D.N.C. June 28,
2010); Cheryl Corley, Gun Activists to Challenge Local Gun Laws, NPR (July 1, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128240691.
21. See Del Quentin Wilber & Paul Duggan, D.C. Is Sued Again over Handgun Rules,
WASH. POST, July 29, 2008, at B1. The lawsuit seeks to toss out many of the new
requirements and also challenges a long-existing ban on machine guns, which includes most
types of semiautomatic pistols. Id.
22. See Myles et al., supra note 18, at 51. The new ordinance includes strict guidelines
on who can apply for a permit, prohibits gun shops within city limits, confines the possession
of loaded firearms to the home, and requires handgun owners to have both city permits and
state firearms identification cards. See Mark Guarino, Chicago Passes Revised Gun Law,
Allowing Handgun Ownership, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 2, 2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2010/0702/Chicago-passes-revised-gun-law-allowinghandgun-ownership.
23. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172(a)(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); Matt
Hamilton, Two 18 Year Olds Challenge Gun Laws, CONNECTAMARILLO.COM (Nov. 28,
2010), http://www.connectamarillo.com/news/story.aspx?id=547076.
24. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(5)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003); Complaint
at 6, Woollard v. Sheridan, No. JFM-10-20668 (D. Md. Dec. 29, 2010); Maria Glod, Gun
Rights Advocates Take Aim at Md. Limits: Federal Suit Challenges State’s Restrictions on
Handgun Carry Permits, WASH. POST, July 30, 2010, at B6.
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25

banning handguns in churches, and gun-free school zone (school zone)
26
laws.
These last challenges—to the statutes that establish a 1000-foot
firearm-free perimeter around schools—are the focus of this Comment.
Because the constitutionality of such laws has been challenged before
27
(albeit on different grounds) and the issue remains a visceral one for
28
citizens struggling with a solution to school violence, a methodical
exploration of this issue is necessary. Part II.A of this Comment will
discuss the state of Second Amendment jurisprudence established by
the Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald. Part II.B will examine
how courts have dealt with challenges to gun-control laws in the shadow
of those decisions. Part III will evaluate possible judicial interpretations
of the Second Amendment using the evolution of First Amendment
interpretation as a model. Part IV dissects how courts could evaluate
the school zone laws by analyzing whether such laws infringe upon a
protected right and balancing this possible infringement using the
different levels of scrutiny that could determine the laws’
constitutionality. Part V recommends solutions that legislatures in
California and Illinois, as well as the United States Congress, can
explore to avoid the possibility that their school zone laws could be
voided as unconstitutional and to strengthen the utility of those laws.
The solutions recommended in this Comment also can be considered by
other states that have abandoned the restrictions in school zones in
recent years due to legal concerns. In fact, states with some of the most
permissive gun laws that allow citizens to carry loaded firearms without
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b)(4) (2006); see also Rhonda Cook, Suit Aims to Lift
Ban on Guns in Church, ATLANTA J.–CONST., July 10, 2010, at B1. A district court dismissed
this challenge finding that, while possessing a firearm in a place of worship was protected by
the Second Amendment, the restriction was substantially related to an important
governmental interest. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1319 (M.D.
Ga. 2011).
26. Complaint at 3, Hall v. Garcia, No. CV10-3799 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011); Amended
Complaint at 11–12, Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, No. 2:10-CV-9-CNC (E.D.
Wis. Feb. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Wisconsin Carry Complaint]; see also Bruce Vielmetti, Gun
Group Sues over Restriction, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 2010, at 3B; Matt Smith, Man
Sues for Right to Carry Gun near Cole Valley’s Grattan School, S.F. WKLY. BLOGS (Aug. 27,
2010, 2:10 PM), http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2010/08/gun_open_ carry_school.php.
27. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–68 (1995) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
invalid as beyond Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause).
28. See, e.g., Carl W. Chamberlin, Johnny Can’t Read ‘Cause Jane’s Got a Gun: The
Effects of Guns in Schools and Options After Lopez, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 287–
88 (1999) (contending that firearms have “increased both the incidence and lethality of school
violence”).
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a state-issued license might want to reconsider their stance given the
possible conflict that such laws create with the once nearly defunct
29
federal Gun-Free School Zones Act.
II. THE STATE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND THE COURTS
AFTER HELLER AND MCDONALD
For nearly seventy years leading into the twenty-first century and the
Heller decision, the contemporary view held by the Supreme Court was
that the Second Amendment protected the right to keep and possess a
weapon only insofar as the weapon bore “some reasonable relationship
30
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.” In United
States v. Miller, the most recent pre-Heller case to consider the issue, the
Court in 1939 upheld a law prohibiting possession of an unregistered
31
sawed-off shotgun in violation of the National Firearms Act. Rejecting
the defendants’ argument that the regulation violated their Second
Amendment right to bear arms, the Court concluded that the
32
Constitution does not guarantee a right to carry such a weapon. As
such, the Court interpreted the right’s protection as extending to the
“obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the

29. See State Firearms Laws Are Taking a Radical, Dangerous Turn, USA TODAY, Apr.
25, 2011, at 8A (reporting that Wyoming became the fourth state, joining Alaska, Arizona,
and Vermont, to allow citizens to carry firearms without licenses). Because the federal law
exempts persons carrying weapons in school zones who have been issued licenses by their
states, it follows that residents in these states will be less likely to have permits and, therefore,
may be more likely to commit felonies by traveling in school zones with their loaded firearms.
See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 921(q)(1) (2006); Bruce Vielmetti, Gun
Charge Against Sheboygan Falls Man Dismissed Again: Bicyclist Carried Firearms Within
1,000 Feet of School, JSONLINE (June 17, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/
96625354.html; marktwain, Sheboygan Falls Open Carry GFSZ Case (Personal Account by
Matthew
Hubing),
FREEREPUBLIC.ORG
(June
19,
2010,
4:06
PM),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2538149/posts [hereinafter Personal Account of
Matthew Hubing].
30. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). Prior to 2008, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided three cases addressing the Second Amendment, each time holding that it
granted only a “collective right” to an armed militia as opposed to an “individual right” to
keep and bear arms. See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment
Scholarship: A Primer, in THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 1, 1 (Carl T.
Bogus ed., 2000). The push for an “individual rights” view of the Second Amendment among
scholars was launched with a student article in 1960, building over the next few decades and
attracting adherents even among law professors considered liberal and, therefore, assumed to
be inclined against such an interpretation. Id. at 1–13.
31. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178, 183.
32. Id. at 178.
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33

effectiveness of [militia] forces.” In addition, among federal appellate
courts, between the Miller and Heller decisions only the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized that the Second Amendment protects an
individual’s right to bear arms, although the court also upheld a
34
challenged law encroaching upon this right.
A. Heller and McDonald and the Changing Second Amendment
Jurisprudence
The Court’s prevailing view, established in Miller, that the Second
Amendment only protects a collective right to bear arms, changed with
35
the Court’s decision in Heller. In the landmark 2008 decision, the
Court found that the Second Amendment protected an individual’s right
to bear arms, rendering unconstitutional a District of Columbia
ordinance that had the effect of prohibiting the possession of handguns
36
or other firearms in readily-operable condition in private homes. The
case concerned an ordinance prohibiting individuals from carrying
unregistered firearms, while simultaneously prohibiting the registration
37
of handguns within the nation’s capital. The ordinance also required
residents to keep their registered firearms unloaded and inoperable—
either disassembled or trigger-locked—unless located in a place of
38
business or used for lawful recreational activities. The plaintiff, Dick
Heller, a special police officer at the Federal Judicial Center, filed his
lawsuit challenging the ordinance after he applied for and was denied
39
registration for a handgun in his home. The Court determined that the
ordinance had the effect of barring the possession of a handgun in the
home in a state that would allow it to be readily used for an individual’s
self-defense, an effect that the majority determined was a violation of
the Second Amendment’s protection of an individual’s right to keep and
40
bear arms.
With McDonald v. City of Chicago in 2010, the Court found that the

33. Id.
34. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001); Adam Winkler,
Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 691 (2007).
35. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591 (2008).
36. See id. at 635.
37. See id. at 574–75 (citing D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4)
(2001)).
38. See id. at 575 (citing D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02).
39. Id. at 575.
40. Id. at 628–29.
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Second Amendment was enforceable against the states, thus
invalidating ordinances in the Illinois municipalities of Chicago and Oak
Park that had the effect of preventing residents from possessing
41
handguns.
In that case, the Chicago ordinance prohibited the
possession of unregistered firearms and prohibited registration of most
42
handguns by most residents. The Oak Park municipal code made it
illegal for individuals to possess “pistols, revolvers, guns and small arms
43
. . . commonly known as handguns.”
Several of the plaintiffs in
McDonald contended that they had been targeted by threats of violence
and wished to possess handguns in their homes for self-defense but were
44
prevented from doing so by the ordinances. The bulk of the Court’s
decision in McDonald centered not on whether an individual right to
possess a handgun in the home for self-defense was protected by the
45
46
Second Amendment, which it already had established in Heller, but
whether the protection of this right under the Second Amendment
could be extended to the states and their subsidiaries (which a plurality
found an affirmative basis in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
47
Amendment).
The Court failed to define the scope of this Second Amendment
right, however, beyond the facts posed by the restrictive ordinances
48
considered in Heller and McDonald. In an opinion authored by Justice
Scalia, the Court stated that “since this case represents this Court’s first
in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect
49
it to clarify the entire field.”
Other than ruling out the use of a
permissive type of interest balancing, the Court declined to identify a
specific standard of review to be used by courts in evaluating the

41. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
42. Id. at 3026; CHI. MUN. CODE §§ 8-20-040(a), 8-20-050(c) (2009).
43. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026 (quoting OAK PARK, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 27-2-1
(2007), 27-1-1 (2009)).
44. Id. at 3026–27.
45. See id. at 3026.
46. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
47. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. Justice Thomas argued in a concurring opinion
that the Second Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Privileges and Immunities Clause. See id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring).
48. See id. at 3026 (detailing the challenged ordinances in Chicago and Oak Park);
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629, 635 (2008). In the majority opinion for
Heller, Justice Scalia identified the District of Columbia’s handgun ban as one of the most
restrictive laws in the nation’s history. Id.
49. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.

HETZNER-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

368

11/28/2011 1:17 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[95:359

50

constitutionality of other firearm restrictions. In addition, although
probably trying to head off potential challenges, the majority appears to
have confused matters further by proffering a non-exhaustive list of laws
51
52
that would withstand judicial scrutiny. In dicta, the Court wrote,
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial
53
sale of arms.
The Court did not provide a clear rationale for its choices of permitted
54
laws.
In McDonald, the Court failed to elaborate on what has been called
55
“Heller’s asterisk.” Instead, a plurality of the Court “repeat[ed] those
assurances” that the listed laws would not be in jeopardy, adding
56
“incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.” The
McDonald Court also quoted thirty-eight state amici supporting the
challenge to the Chicago and Oak Park ordinances: “[S]tate and local
experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue
57
under the Second Amendment.” Muddying its efforts to pacify the
50. See id. at 634–35.
51. Id. at 626–27, 627 n.26.
52. “Dictum,” the singular form of the word “dicta,” is defined as “[a] statement of
opinion or belief considered authoritative because of the dignity of the person making it.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, although “dicta” can be considered a
pejorative and outside of a court’s holding, by definition it carries with it a certain weight of
authority. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, “Supreme Court dicta controls
when it is on point and it is the only available authority.” See United States v. Chester, 367 F.
App’x 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2010). Such dicta has been described as nearly as binding as the
Court’s holdings. See Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996).
Furthermore, the Heller Court’s dicta has been described as “dicta of the strongest sort.” See
Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller
and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1372 (2009).
53. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
54. See id. at 635 (acknowledging that “there will be time enough to expound upon the
historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions
come before us”).
55. See Miguel E. Larios, To Heller and Back: Why Many Second Amendment Questions
Remain Unanswered After United States v. Hayes, FED. LAW., Sept. 2009, at 58, 60.
56. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010).
57. Id. at 3046 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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fears of local officials, however, the Court in McDonald acknowledged
that protections against state infringement of constitutional rights can
58
differ from protections for federal infringement and that its decision
59
“will to some extent limit the legislative freedom of the [s]tates.” Thus,
with its opinion in McDonald, the Court ignored judges who had been
practically begging for a clearer standard upon which to evaluate the
60
constitutionality of gun-control regulations.
B. Court Decisions After Heller and McDonald
Commentators and courts have cited the lack of guidance provided
in the Heller and McDonald decisions for prompting numerous legal
61
challenges to come. Such was the argument made by Justice Stevens in
his dissent to Heller where he criticized the Court’s majority for leaving
a “formidable task” to future courts and questioned whether it would
62
substantially increase the caseload of federal judges.
In the wake of Heller and McDonald, challenges to gun-control laws
have been rife in federal courts, even when the implicated laws were
explicitly supported by the language in the cases’ dicta. The most
common challenges in the immediate aftermath have been brought by
felons contesting prohibitions on their possession of firearms by 18
58. Id. at 3032. Justice Stevens reiterated this idea in his dissent, arguing that “[t]he
rights protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause need not be identical in shape or scope to the rights protected against Federal
Government infringement by the various provisions of the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 3093
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens later suggested that “[s]o long as the regulatory measures
they have chosen are not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable’ we should be allowing
[states] to ‘try novel social and economic’ policies.” Id. at 3114 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 3050.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 742 F. Supp. 2d 855, 857 (S.D. W. Va. 2010) (noting
that the Heller Court “declined to announce the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny
for review of the firearms restriction at issue in that case”); United States v. Staten, No. 09CR-00235, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91653, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 2, 2010) (blaming
uncertainty by courts in evaluating subsequent Second Amendment cases on “the absence of
direct guidance” and “what some view as a categorical carve out for certain firearm
regulations” provided by the Court in Heller); Warden v. Nickels, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1228
(W.D. Wash. 2010) (noting the “limited guidance as to how to evaluate the constitutionality
of gun regulations under the Second Amendment” provided by Heller); United States v.
Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787 (E.D. Va. 2009) (pointing out that the Heller decision
“does not squarely address or decide the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to statutes
and regulations subject to Second Amendment challenges”).
61. See Myles, supra note 18, at 51; Wilkinson, supra note 17, at 280, 288 (predicting
after Heller, but before the McDonald decision, that “the litigation will take off” due to the
many questions left open by the Heller opinion).
62. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 679–80 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 63 Ten circuits, as well as a number of district courts,
64
have thus far upheld the statute against such challenges. Three of
these circuits held that the presumption favoring gun controls on felons
is not dicta but rather a condition that is part of the individual right to
bear arms and, therefore, “the Supreme Court’s discussion in Heller of
the categorical exceptions to the Second Amendment was not abstract
65
and hypothetical; it was outcome-determinative.” Similarly, at least
one district court has rejected a challenge to the federal Gun-Free
66
Courts’
School Zones Act based on the same language in Heller.
deference to lawmakers in these and other decisions has resulted in an
67
expansion of the Court-given exceptions, sometimes without applying
68
the historical analysis that the Court seemed to favor.
In considering what the Court meant in establishing its exceptions to
the Second Amendment right for individuals to bear arms, some courts
have examined the general ideas that those exceptions seem to support
and have applied those general ideas to the circumstances presented by
69
individual cases. Such a reading led a Washington district judge to
63. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)? Lower
Courts and the New Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1248 (2008–2009).
64. See United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v.
Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 805 (2010); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118
(9th Cir. 2010); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1686 (2010); United States v. Stuckey, 317 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2814 (2009);
United States v. Frazier, 314 F. App’x 801, 807 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Brunson, 292
F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Irish, 285 F. App’x 326, 327 (8th Cir. 2008);
Denning & Reynolds, supra note 63, at 1248–49 & nn.23–25. But cf. Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d
320, 323 (N.C. 2009) (finding a state law prohibiting a felon from possessing a firearm violated
the state’s constitutional protection of an individual right to bear arms as applied to a
nonviolent offender whose civil rights had been restored to him).
65. Barton, 633 F.3d at 172; see also Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.6; Vongxay, 594 F.3d at
1115.
66. See United States v. Lewis, 50 V.I. 995, 1000–01 (D.V.I. 2008).
67. See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 63, at 1248.
68. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (“Where a challenged statute apparently falls into one of the categories
signaled by the Supreme Court as constitutional, courts have relied on the ‘presumptively
lawful’ language to uphold laws in relatively summary fashion.”). Not only did the Court
undertake its own historical review in Heller, it also used the qualifier “longstanding” in
defining the types of gun-control laws and regulations it deemed constitutional. See District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605–26 (2008); Recent Case, United States v. Bledsoe,
No. SA-08-CR-13(2), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60522 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2008), 122 HARV. L.
REV. 827, 831–32 (2008) [hereinafter Texas Upholds Gun Regulation].
69. See, e.g., Warden v. Nickels, 697 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1229 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
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deem that banning guns in parks fell within the Court’s exceptions for
70
laws prohibiting possession of firearms in “sensitive places.” The court
determined that “[a]s with a government building or a school, a cityowned park where children and youth recreate is a ‘sensitive’ place
71
where it is permissible to ban possession of firearms.”
Such broadly drawn interpretations of Heller’s exceptions are often
72
coupled with a narrow construction of the decision’s central holding.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, found the majority’s holding restrained to
73
“the right ‘to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.’”
The majority itself seemed to limit even further the application of the
Second Amendment right to only weapons “in common use at the time”
74
75
of the amendment’s ratification, in certain confrontations, as well as
76
for certain manners and purposes. The manners and purposes of this
constitutional right are without much elaboration in the opinion,
77
although self-defense (or “immediate self-defense”) is unquestionably
78
protected.
The caution by lower courts to not overturn existing legislation could
be the result of confusion over which standard of review to apply when
evaluating the constitutionality of gun-control laws—a quandary that
79
Justice Breyer predicted when Heller was decided. The majority ruled
out tests that would ask whether a law burdens a protected interest
80
disproportionately to other important government interests or whether
81
a law is justified by advancing a “legitimate state interest.” But, the
majority did not leave many more breadcrumbs as to which standard of
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787–88 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(stating that “Heller’s dicta is notable for the degree to which it confirms the limited scope of
the case’s holding”).
73. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 646 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting the majority).
74. Id. at 627.
75. See id. at 595 (“[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of
citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation.”).
76. See id. at 626 (citing early treatises and cases finding that the Second Amendment
right “was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever
and for whatever purpose”).
77. Id. at 635.
78. See id. at 628–29.
79. See id. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 634–35.
81. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 699–700.
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review would be appropriate. Although Justice Scalia rejected the
application of interest balancing for laws that would restrict an
82
individual’s Second Amendment rights, the language of Heller raises
questions about whether he meant to exclude all forms of interest
balancing or simply the limited form that he attributed to Justice
83
Breyer’s dissent. In fact, Justice Scalia suggested that Justice Breyer’s
form of interest balancing for Second Amendment rights would not
meet the requirements for the strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or
84
rational-basis tests. Therefore, by explicitly denying the application of
only the novel interest-balancing approach and rational-basis test, the
Court left open whether it intended other forms of interest balancing to
85
be used to evaluate laws or whether it favored a categorical approach.
As a result, lower courts have used strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny, and an undue burden-type test in evaluating whether laws
86
violate the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.
Under
strict scrutiny, a law would have to be shown to serve a compelling
government interest and also be narrowly tailored to serve that interest
87
to be found constitutional. Intermediate scrutiny, on the other hand,
requires the government to show a “substantial relationship” between
its restriction on a constitutional right and an “important” government
88
objective.
Both of those tests are more common than the undueburden test, which is largely confined to analyzing laws restricting
89
abortion rights.
Under the undue burden test, introduced by the
Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a law runs afoul of the
Constitution when it poses an undue burden on an individual’s ability to
90
exercise a recognized right.
Commentators
also
have
recommended
“a
deferential
reasonableness” balancing test, in which nearly any regulation that does
82. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
83. Id. at 634.
84. See id. at 634–35.
85. See id. at 635 (identifying, without explicit clarity, some categorical carve-outs of
individuals’ Second Amendment rights but not identifying this approach as the governing
test). For a more thorough discussion, see infra notes 125–41 and accompanying text.
86. United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 787 (E.D. Va. 2009).
87. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997).
88. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 671
(3d ed. 2006).
89. See Mark Tushnet, Permissible Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About
Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1437 (2009).
90. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
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not amount to an outright ban could be supported by the government’s
91
“compelling interest,” or a “deferential form of strict scrutiny” in
which “a reviewing court would accord the government limited
deference in satisfying both the compelling-interest and narrow-tailoring
92
prongs” of a traditional strict scrutiny inquiry. Such discord could be
good news for gun-control advocates, in whose favor the lower courts
thus far have sided, by upholding existing laws restricting firearm
93
rights. But how long the string of decisions in their favor can last is
uncertain.
Even though courts thus far have gone out of their way to preserve
existing gun restrictions, these recent decisions have not quelled
94
predictions that statutes will fall. Given the brevity with which the
Supreme Court dispatched its list of presumably constitutional guncontrol laws, a careful analysis by courts should be triggered when
weighing challenges to such laws, even if they appear to fall within the
Court’s dicta. As one commentator noted in an example, Justice
Scalia—a former school rifle team member—likely did not intend to
uphold bans on guns used at private schools that teach defensive gun use
or hunting skills, despite writing that he would support laws banning
95
firearms in schools. In her dissent to an en banc opinion vacating the
decision of a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
Judge Diane Sykes provided a spirited argument for a more thorough
review by courts and a greater effort by public officials to defend their
gun-control restrictions:

91. See Cameron Desmond, Comment, From Cities to Schoolyards: The Implications of
an Individual Right to Bear Arms on the Constitutionality of Gun-Free Zones, 39 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 1043, 1062 (2008).
92. Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework Within
District of Columbia v. Heller, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1535, 1572 (2009).
93. See Robert J. Cahall, Note, Local Gun Control Laws After District of Columbia v.
Heller: Silver Bullets or Shooting Blanks? The Case for Strong State Preemption of Local Gun
Control Laws, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359, 372–73 (2010).
94. See William G. Merkel, Heller as Hubris, and How McDonald v. City of Chicago
May Well Change the Constitutional World as We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1221,
1254 (2010) (predicting that conflicts between the Heller Court’s dicta and Justice Scalia’s
favoring of gun rights will doom the now-protected restrictions).
95. See David B. Kopel, Pretend “Gun-Free” School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42
CONN. L. REV. 515, 518, 522 (2009) (noting separately that Justice Scalia was a member of his
school’s rifle team and that the Heller dicta should not be read as if it were a statute that
would allow the ban on their use at private schools that teach defensive gun use or hunting
skills).
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[T]here are several ways to understand the Court’s analysis in
Heller in light of its limiting dicta about exceptions. But we
cannot read Heller’s dicta in a way that swallows its holdings.
The government normally has the burden of justifying the
application of laws that criminalize the exercise of enumerated
constitutional rights. We should follow that norm, not pay lip
96
service to it.
The majority in Heller predicted—indeed, almost invited—these
97
challenges.
Justice Scalia’s opinion referenced the long history of
litigation that followed the Court’s “first in-depth Free Exercise Clause
98
case” as support for his lack of specificity about the types of guncontrol laws that would withstand judicial evaluation after the 2008
99
decision.
He also justified the exceptions enumerated in “Heller’s
100
asterisk” by comparing them to the lack of First Amendment
101
protections for “obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets.”
Commentators likewise have drawn comparisons between the First and
Second Amendment in predicting how future cases that elaborate on
the individual right guaranteed by the Second Amendment will be
102
decided.
Thus, the copious First Amendment jurisprudence that is
already available could provide worthwhile lessons for those searching
for a roadmap on how to define the newfound rights guaranteed by the
Second Amendment.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A BLUEPRINT FOR EVOLVING SECOND
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Many have suggested, both leading up to and after the decisions in
96. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 654 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., dissenting). A
similar sentiment was voiced in a concurring opinion to a Tenth Circuit decision that upheld
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by felons. See United
States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047–48 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring)
(expressing concern over “the possible tension between Heller’s dictum and its underlying
holding” and that “the dictum inhibits lower courts from exploring the contours of Heller and
its application to firearm restrictions”).
97. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
98. See id. at 635; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878) (upholding a law
criminalizing polygamy).
99. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
100. See Larios, supra note 55, at 60 (commenting on “Heller’s Asterisk”).
101. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
102. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 377–81, 399 (2009); Desmond, supra note 91, at 1065–71.
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Heller and McDonald, that the Court should follow the same approach
in interpreting Second Amendment rights as has been taken to define an
103
individual’s rights under the First Amendment.
Indeed, Justice
Scalia’s reference to the voluminous case law establishing the Court’s
jurisprudence in the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause cases
104
would seem to bolster this approach. Gun-rights proponents likely are
drawn to the First Amendment because several of its provisions—
namely the freedoms of association and assembly—prompt a strict
105
scrutiny review by courts. But this ignores other rights under the First
106
According to
Amendment that do not receive such protection.
Professor Joseph Blocher, “free speech doctrine has been pockmarked
with categorical exclusions and stretched and trimmed with balancing
107
tests.”
The Court’s decision in Heller, with its enumerated
108
exceptions, could be interpreted as creating similar categorical carveouts for individuals’ Second Amendment rights.
Under a categorical approach, courts determine the scope of the
rights protected by the Constitution and then evaluate whether a
109
challenged activity infringes upon these protected rights. In contrast,
with the generally defined interest-balancing approach, a court is called
upon to weigh an individual’s constitutionally-protected right against the
government’s interest in an activity that infringes on that more broadly110
drawn right. As such, categoricalism is seen as a way to remove the
judge from the equation in defining infringement of a fundamental
constitutional right or, as conservatives would put it, prevent judicial
111
activism. As Blocher explains,
103. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131
S. Ct. 958, 958–59 (2011); Blocher, supra note 102, at 399; Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee
Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control
Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 85, 102–03 (2010); Winkler, supra note 34, at 706.
104. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
105. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 693.
106. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 402.
107. Id.
108. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
109. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 293–94 (1992) (“When categorical formulas operate, all
the important work in litigation is done at the outset. Once the relevant right and mode of
infringement have been described, the outcome follows, without any explicit judicial
balancing of the claimed right against the government’s justification for the infringement.”).
110. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 381–82.
111. See Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
555, 558 (2010) (arguing that Republican lawmakers have traditionally equated judicial
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Categoricalism allows a judge to transform some background
value into a rule that will govern all subsequent cases inside the
category without any further reference to the background
principle or value. The creation of the category cuts off future
adjudicators from the underlying value and prohibits the
112
reweighing of interests.
The critical factor in categoricalism, therefore, is to define the
fundamental value protected by the Constitution and ensure that the
categories of activities that fall within and outside this value are
113
protected or excluded from constitutional guarantees.
Applied to the First Amendment’s Free Speech doctrine, the
categories of obscenity, libel, and child pornography have been declared
114
by the Court to not receive constitutional protection.
This would
appear to be a strong case of categoricalism in which large categories of
speech are deemed not to receive the constitutional protections
extended to other types of speech. But, at the same time, commercial
speech has been declared to fall under the Free Speech protections of
the First Amendment, but not under the same level of protection
115
accorded to political speech.
In this aspect of distinguishing the
protections provided to commercial versus political speech, therefore,
the Court could be seen as engaging in—and, by extension, instructing
lower courts also to employ—a sort of interest balancing by evaluating
whether laws are constitutional under a certain level of scrutiny.
Likewise, the time, place, and manner restrictions that the Court allows
for protected speech indicate something other than a categorical
116
approach.
In cases involving such permitted restrictions on
constitutionally-protected speech, courts have generally applied a form
activism with a willingness to limit government on constitutional grounds).
112. Blocher, supra note 102, at 382.
113. See id. at 383 (noting that when a category and underlying value do not align
“absurdities such as significant over- or underinclusion can undermine the category’s
legitimacy and stability”).
114. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (child pornography); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (obscenity); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269
(1964) (libel); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (libel).
115. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (reasoning that
“[t]o require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech
alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech”).
116. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 397.
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of intermediate scrutiny in weighing whether the government interest
117
justifies the burden on speech.
Thus, the courts have engaged in
interest balancing for some forms of speech protected by the First
118
Amendment.
The differences between the categorical approach and the interestbalancing approach can be seen in how courts treat offensive, but not
obscene, speech. This was the issue before the Court in Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, the renowned
case involving the threatened punishment of a radio station for
broadcasting comedian George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” monologue in
119
the middle of a weekday. Although the issue was not before the Court
in the case, if the Court had determined that the monologue was
obscene, its inquiry would have ended and the Federal Communications
Commission’s (FCC) actions would have been upheld as an allowable
120
regulation on unprotected speech not in violation of the Constitution.
On the other end of the spectrum, if the monologue had been
determined to be of political nature, the Court indicated that the radio
station could receive absolute protection under the First Amendment
121
and the commission’s attempt to regulate it would have been unlawful.
Such deference shows the high value that the courts place on political
speech, and the corresponding high hurdle that the government would
have to overcome to demonstrate that its interest in regulating such
speech justified its regulation.
But, because Carlin’s monologue was merely considered indecent
with no political bent, the Court evaluated whether the speech deserved
protection under the First Amendment and how much protection it
should be afforded through a form of interest balancing that placed a
122
lower value on his speech.
In the end, the Court held that the
individual circumstances in which such offensive language is used
determine whether the speech will be constitutionally protected from a
117. See id. at 391–92.
118. See id. According to Blocher, “intermediate scrutiny in all of its forms represents
‘an overtly balancing mode’—perhaps ‘the only genuine balancing mode that we have.’” Id.
at 392 (quoting Sullivan, supra note 109, at 297; and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Governmental
Interests and Unconstitutional Conditions Law: A Case Study in Categorization and Balancing,
55 ALB. L. REV. 605, 606 (1992)).
119. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729–30 (1978).
120. See id. at 742, 746 (noting the radio station’s argument that, as long as the broadcast
was not obscene, the Constitution does not permit any regulation).
121. See id. at 746.
122. See id. at 746–48.
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123

particular regulation.
As Justice Stevens identified in his plurality
opinion, “the constitutional protection accorded to a communication
containing such patently offensive sexual and excretory language need
124
not be the same in every context.”
Turning to the First Amendment for guidance in interpreting the
Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald, the Court’s exemption for
laws that forbid the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally
125
ill could be compared to the First Amendment categorical exemptions
126
Does this then
for “obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets.”
endorse a categorical approach in interpreting the Second Amendment?
In a categorical approach, laws are evaluated on whether they fall within
a category protected by an underlying value of a right in which
127
regulation will not be permitted as opposed to, say, whether the law is
128
or
“rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives”
129
“substantially related to an important governmental objective,” as
provided under different levels of scrutiny. When considered within the
right to protect oneself in one’s home, laws that single out certain types
130
of people (e.g., felons and the mentally ill) and weapons (e.g., firearms
131
not in common use at our nation’s founding), and that are generally
unnecessary to protect that right should be found constitutional. This
would appear to be the Court endorsing a categorical approach to
interpreting the infringement of an individual’s Second Amendment
right.
But the Heller Court’s allowance for laws that exclude “the carrying
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
132
buildings”
more closely resembles “time, place, and manner
133
restrictions” under the First Amendment, which require courts to
123. See id. at 747–48.
124. Id. at 747.
125. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010); District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
126. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
127. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 382.
128. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (stating that this is the minimum
requirement to uphold the constitutionality of government legislation).
129. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (defining this as intermediate scrutiny,
applicable to classes based on gender or illegitimacy).
130. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
131. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627; United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
132. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
133. See Desmond, supra note 91, at 1065–71.
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134

apply an interest-balancing approach. Using time, place, and manner
restrictions, the Court has upheld content-neutral regulations on speech
135
such as requiring parade licenses, limiting where abortion protesters
136
and mandating volume controls at outdoor
can demonstrate,
137
concerts by weighing the restrictions’ reasonableness in service of a
significant government interest against the First Amendment rights of
138
the regulated speakers. A court could determine that the Heller Court
meant to allow a similar balancing of the government’s interest in
protecting “sensitive places” against an individual’s Second Amendment
139
right to carry a firearm.
Certainly, such a restriction is analogous to
the First Amendment’s restrictions that acknowledge certain places
140
where speech can be restricted. Thus, the Court could be seen to have
endorsed the same level of interest balancing that is used to evaluate the
First Amendment’s time, place, and manner restrictions for the Second
141
Amendment’s “sensitive places” restrictions: intermediate scrutiny.
One resolution to this conundrum, in which the Court appears to
endorse both categoricalism and some form of interest balancing,
suggests that the category of rights established for protection by Heller
relates to whether such a right was subject to regulation at the time of
142
the writing of the Constitution. Essentially, this view determines the
values protected by the Second Amendment based on the types of laws
143
that existed when the amendment was ratified. Several aspects of the
Heller decision, including its lengthy discourse on eighteenth-century
144
laws, dictionary terms, and nineteenth-century interpretations, support
this historical approach. “Heller’s asterisk” refers to the possibility of
134. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 397.
135. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
136. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757 (1994).
137. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789–92 (1989).
138. See id. at 791.
139. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 408.
140. Although the Court has declared that students do not shed their constitutional
rights at the schoolhouse door, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969), it also has determined that more restrictions can be placed on speech within the
school environment than in other public places, id. at 507.
141. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 391–92, 397.
142. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 649–51 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J.,
dissenting). Judge Sykes asserted in Skoien that where historians disagree about the status of
a particular law at the time of ratification, courts should be hesitant about upholding laws that
infringe upon an individual’s Second Amendment rights. Id. at 651.
143. See id.
144. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580–619 (2008).
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employing “exhaustive historical analysis” to determine the “full scope
of the Second Amendment” as well as whether the “longstanding”
145
prohibitions on Second Amendment rights are still lawful.
Furthermore, the Court interprets the ruling in United States v. Miller as
a restriction on the protection of weapons “in common use at the time”
of the Second Amendment’s ratification, finding that the earlier Court
had difficulty with the type of weapon involved in the case and not that
146
Under this type of
the possession was unrelated to militia activity.
historical interpretation, a law is presumptively constitutional if it or an
147
This approach was
analogous restriction was employed in 1791.
arguably taken by Judge Sykes in her original opinion for a three-judge
148
panel of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Skoien, which was
149
In her dissent to that later
overturned by an en banc decision.
decision, Judge Sykes criticized her colleagues for not undertaking a
historical review of the gun-control law challenged in the case (a federal
statute forbidding those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence
150
from possessing firearms) to determine whether it violated the Second
151
Amendment.
But there are problems with this approach, namely the burden it
places upon inexpert judges with weighty caseloads to conduct adequate
historical research before determining the constitutionality of the
152
Such examinations also could
nation’s myriad gun-control laws.
produce results even more confusing than under the categorical
approach, upholding regulations solely based on whether they existed at
the time of the country’s founding while ruling out regulations without
153
such historical ties that would otherwise deserve to be upheld.

145. Id. at 626–27; see also Larios, supra note 55, at 60 (commenting on “Heller’s
Asterisk”).
146. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
147. Texas Upholds Gun Regulation, supra note 68, at 831.
148. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, 614 F.3d 638 (7th
Cir. 2010).
149. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 644–45.
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).
151. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 648 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for
interpreting a categorical protection for a law criminalizing persons convicted of
misdemeanor domestic violence when whether “categorical disarmament is proper as part of
the original meaning of the Second Amendment has not been established” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
152. See Texas Upholds Gun Regulation, supra note 68, at 833.
153. See id.
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Furthermore, it is not apparent that such a historical approach could
be taken when determining the constitutionality of limiting an
individual’s Second Amendment rights in particular places. Although a
ban on the possession of deadly weapons by felons or the mentally ill
could have a seemingly clear-cut historical basis, defining what
constitutes a “sensitive” place requires a flexibility not afforded by a
strictly historical, categorical approach. Airports, for example, pose a
problem that a historical analysis would have to contort itself to solve;
so too, in an age of fear about biological or other forms of terrorism, do
154
water treatment plants and even food distribution facilities.
What is likely to result, then, is precisely what commentators and the
Court itself suggested in Heller: a combination of categorical and
155
interest-balancing approaches to enforcing the Second Amendment.
Those laws that exclude certain types of people from receiving permits
to carry firearms or restrict certain types of firearms will likely
constitute a categorical exception to the Second Amendment’s
protection of an individual right to possess a handgun for ready use in
self-defense and be evaluated according to whether they fall within or
outside of the scope of that right. At the same time, those laws that
restrict the possession of firearms in certain places will most likely be
evaluated by whether they are tied closely enough to a government
interest that justifies an infringement on a constitutional right, perhaps
with special deference paid to whether that restriction was present at the
time of ratification and is presumptively lawful.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONE LAWS
AFTER HELLER AND MCDONALD
Following the Court’s decision in Heller, numerous lawsuits were
filed in both federal and state courts challenging the constitutionality of
156
gun-control laws. Two of those suits sought to overturn school zone
laws in California and Wisconsin that restricted the possession of

154. See Mara Rose Williams, On the Front Lines of Bioterror Defense—Killer
Pathogens Could Bring Disaster: K-State Experts Lead the Way, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 25,
2006, at A1.
155. See Blocher, supra note 102, at 413 (arguing that although the Heller majority
professed to be taking a categorical approach, in defining whether laws violate an individual’s
Second Amendment rights, the Court likely will adopt a mixture of categoricalism and
interest balancing as it has done with the First Amendment).
156. See, e.g., supra note 64 and sources cited therein.
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157

firearms within 1000 feet of school grounds.
A district court judge
158
upheld the California law against the pro se attack.
Meanwhile, the
Wisconsin Legislature likely rendered moot the pending lawsuit
challenging its statute when it erased the 1000-foot gun-free perimeter
159
around state schools for licensed carriers.
As this Comment will
argue, however, there is a better way for legislatures to approach the
issue in preserving citizens’ Second Amendment rights and protecting
160
schoolchildren from violence. This bears consideration both in states
that already have changed their laws and those concerned that existing
statutes might not survive legal challenges.
Although one district court has already upheld the federal school
161
zone law against a Second Amendment challenge, a federal appeals
court previously raised questions about whether the law would survive
162
judicial scrutiny.
The Fifth Circuit introduced the possibility of a
successful challenge in a footnote to its decision in United States v.
Lopez, a case that resulted in the prior version of the federal Gun-Free
School Zones Act being ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
163
on Commerce Clause grounds. The appellate court wrote in the preHeller decision, “It is also conceivable that some applications of section
922(q) might raise Second Amendment concerns. Lopez does not raise
the Second Amendment and thus we do not now consider it.
Nevertheless, this orphan of the Bill of Rights may be something of a
164
brooding omnipresence here.”
Although the Fifth Circuit opinion predates the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Heller and McDonald, little from those recent opinions
would explicitly shield school zone laws today. The Heller decision
qualifies the types of gun-control laws that would be found
165
constitutional with the word “longstanding,” while also protecting laws
157. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *1, *16
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011); Wisconsin Carry Complaint, supra note 26, at 11–12.
158. See Garcia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *1, *16.
159. WIS. STAT. § 948.605 (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 35, §§ 91–96.
160. See infra Part V.
161. See United States v. Lewis, 50 V.I. 995, 1000–01 (D.V.I. 2008).
162. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364 n.46 (5th Cir. 1993).
163. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
164. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364 n.46.
165. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). The common
interpretation appears to be that the Court was affirming longstanding laws prohibiting
firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill as well as longstanding prohibitions on
firearm possession in sensitive places. See Texas Upholds Gun Regulation, supra note 68, at
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prohibiting firearm possession “in” sensitive places such as schools. A
Court that reached back to the 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s
dictionary to supply a definition for its opinion would be unlikely to
167
view the state or federal school zone acts as longstanding.
Furthermore, individuals within the 1000-foot school zone perimeter are
arguably not “in” sensitive areas.
The preceding sections contained an examination of the types of
review that the Court endorsed in its decisions in Heller and McDonald
168
as well as those that have been recommended by observers. Although
the standard of review is yet to be determined, the best way to apply the
Court’s decision in future Second Amendment cases would be through a
169
two-part test. First, a court must ask whether a challenged regulation
implicates a right protected by the Second Amendment by looking at
whether the restrictions (1) impose upon firearm possession by a
category of people or type of firearms that have not been subject to

832. It also could be argued that the “longstanding” modifier only applies to the first part of
the sentence and not the laws identified farther from this modifier. In that case, laws that
restrict firearm possession in sensitive places and laws that place “conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” would be viewed as constitutional regardless of
when they were instituted. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
166. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
167. See id. at 581.
168. See supra Parts II–III.
169. Several courts and commentators have suggested similar approaches, although the
one suggested here may not be completely identical. The Third Circuit has advocated an
approach that starts the inquiry by asking whether a challenged law burdens conduct falling
within the Second Amendment’s protection. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89
(3d. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958, 958–59 (2011). If it does not, the law is
constitutional. Id. If the law does implicate protected conduct, then the court should subject
the law to means-end scrutiny to determine if the law is constitutional or invalid. Id. The
Fourth Circuit has applied this two-prong approach. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d
673, 680–82 (4th Cir. 2010). One commentator also supports a similar two-prong approach,
suggesting that the first prong regarding whether a challenged activity is protected by the
Second Amendment be based on whether the challenged regulation implicates a lawful
purpose of firearm use or a class of firearms in use at the time of ratification. See Gould,
supra note 92, at 1562–64. In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Sykes started the analysis in her
later-vacated opinion by evaluating whether a law is categorically invalid under the Second
Amendment or, alternately, valid because it regulates conduct “that falls outside of the term
of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was certified.” United States v.
Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). A court
need perform no further exploration for such a categorically valid law, she wrote. Id. at 809.
But all other laws should be subjected to a level of means-end scrutiny based on “how closely
the law comes to the core right and severity of the law’s burden on that right,” according to
Sykes’ analysis. Id.
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170

“longstanding” laws that prohibit their possession or (2) infringe upon
a lawful purpose for firearm possession (i.e., not just “any sort of
171
confrontation”).
If enforcement of the law does not impose upon a
lawful purpose of firearm possession by all people, but instead imposes
blanket restrictions upon a class of people that have not been subject to
such legal regulations for very long or upon a group of weaponry
commonly in use at the time of ratification, then a court should
172
categorically strike the law down. If a court finds that the regulation
implicates the second category, however, by infringing upon an
otherwise lawful purpose no matter who the law applies to or what types
of firearms it regulates, the court must determine if the regulation is
constitutional by evaluating whether the challenged restriction survives
173
a certain standard of review.
Given that the school zone laws potentially fall into the second type
of restriction—implicating a lawful purpose of firearm possession rather
than banning possession by a class of persons or of a group of
weaponry—this Comment will evaluate the constitutionality of the
states’ school zone laws by analyzing whether the right to carry a loaded
firearm on public property within 1000 feet of a school is protected by
the Second Amendment. The analysis will continue by assessing
whether the laws can still survive different levels of scrutiny that could
be applied by the courts if they were to find that the school zone laws
infringe upon a protected right. The origins of these laws are important
in determining how much deference courts should grant to the drafters
of the school zone laws.
A. The Development of Gun-Free School Zone Laws
Laws in California and Illinois banning the possession of loaded
firearms within 1000 feet of schools were adopted within five years of
each other and the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act during the first
174
half of the 1990s. At the time, widely publicized incidents had raised

170. See, e.g., Chester, 628 F.3d at 676, 680; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89–95; Skoien, 587
F.3d at 808–09; Gould, supra note 92, at 1562–64.
171. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595.
172. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91, 94; Gould, supra note 92, at 1563–64.
173. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 676; Skoien, 587 F.3d at 809; Gould, supra note 92, at 1562–
64.
174. See 87th GEN. ASSEMB., H.R. TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 150–51 (Ill. June 18, 1992)
(statement of Rep. Laurino); SENATE FLOOR BILL ANALYSIS OF AB 645, at 1 (Cal. Aug. 22,
1994); Andrew Gottesman, Guns Are Shattering Quiet Around Schools in Suburbs, CHI.
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175

fears about the safety of schools. In advocating for the federal law in
1990, U.S. Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin highlighted cases of
individuals who killed or wounded children with firearms on school
grounds as well as concerns about the escalating presence of weaponry
176
among students.
When the law was revised, President Bill Clinton
reiterated the purpose of the law as a way to combat campus violence
177
and keep schools safe.
In June 1992, the Illinois General Assembly passed an amendment
adding a firearms ban to an existing statute that outlawed drugs within
178
1000 feet of schools, parks, and public housing.
Arguing in favor of
passage of the new law, Illinois State Representative Bill Laurino
referenced increasing problems with violence, not just in the city of
179
Chicago, but throughout the state. Representative Laurino stated the
following on the floor of the Illinois House of Representatives:
This year alone we’re already about 20% ahead of last year’s
record-setting [murder] rate and this piece of legislation is trying
to put a cap on some of these people that think it’s okay just to
drive around your neighborhoods and use innocent people as
180
targets, just because they think it’s fun.
During the 1992–1993 school year, “158 guns were confiscated on or
181
near public school grounds” in Chicago.
Similarly, California’s law
was introduced as an answer to a concern about the growing issue of
182
school violence in that state.
TRIB., Sept. 23, 1993, § 1, at 1.
175. See Jeremy Gerard, Jennings Creates a Gun-Control Special, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1990, at C18; Schools Are Relatively Safe, U.S. Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, § 1, at
40; Walsh, supra note 1, at D1.
176. See supra notes 6–9 and accompanying text.
177. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A
DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT OF
1990, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-72, at 1 (1995) (“I am committed to doing everything in my power
to make schools places where young people can be secure, where they can learn, and where
parents can be confident that discipline is enforced.”).
178. See 87th GEN. ASSEMB., H.R. TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 143, 151 (Ill. June 18,
1992) (statement of Rep. Laurino).
179. See id. at 150.
180. Id.
181. See Andrew Gottesman, Guns Are Shattering Quiet Around Schools in Suburbs,
CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 1993, § 1, at 1.
182. See SENATE FLOOR BILL ANALYSIS OF AB 645, at 1 (Cal. Aug. 22, 1994). A
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Although linked, the federal and state laws vary in certain ways.
The federal Gun-Free School Zones Act makes it a crime to knowingly
possess a firearm that has moved in or otherwise affects interstate or
183
foreign commerce within 1000 feet of a public or private school. The
law makes exceptions if possession is on private, non-school grounds; if
the state has licensed the individual to carry the firearm; if the firearm is
not loaded and is contained in a locked container or firearm rack within
a motor vehicle; if the firearm’s use is part of a school-sanctioned
program; if the possession is by law enforcement in an official capacity;
or if the firearm is unloaded and carried by a person gaining access to
184
hunting grounds and has been approved by school personnel.
The law was originally adopted in 1990 before being invalidated in
1995 by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’
185
lawmaking power under the Commerce Clause. Congress re-enacted
the law in 1996, introducing the limitation that the firearm must have
186
moved in interstate commerce. While that revision did little to limit
187
the law’s potential application, the federal law has been regarded as
“mostly irrelevant” given that many states and school districts already
188
had their own bans by the time it was enacted and criminal activity and
189
education have traditionally been governed by state law. In addition,
the enactment of state laws in recent years that expanded the permitting
of firearms also has limited the federal law’s effect, given its exception
190
that allows licensed individuals within the 1000-foot gun-free zone.
measure proposed as a penalty enhancer for felonies committed by gang members within
1000 feet of schools was to address the fact that “[a] bulk of actual violence and crime occurs
right around the campus.” ASSEMB. COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, BILL ANALYSIS OF AB 645, at
2 (Cal. Apr. 20, 1993). According to the measure’s author, “increas[ing] penalties for crimes
committed in a school zone will hopefully deter such actions around our schools and provide
a greater degree of safety for our children and teachers.” Id. School zone law opponents,
however, point out that prior to passage of the federal law in 1990, only seven shootings had
taken place at American schools; in contrast, seventy-eight incidents followed in the
seventeen years after passage of that law and similar state statutes. See Kopel, supra note 95,
at 519.
183. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 § 1702(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2) (2006).
184. See id.
185. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–52 (1995).
186. See Chamberlin, supra note 28, at 331; Kopel, supra note 95, at 519.
187. See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A
DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT OF
1990, H.R. DOC. NO. 104-72, at 1 (1995).
188. See Kopel, supra note 95, at 518–19.
189. See Chamberlin, supra note 28, at 306.
190. See Kopel, supra note 95, at 518–20. Since 1961, forty states have implemented
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That could change, however, with the recent movement toward
“constitutional carry” laws where certain residents are allowed to carry
191
firearms—openly or concealed—without obtaining a state permit.
If
such permissive laws result in fewer residents obtaining permits from
their states, then the federal law may see new life—as well as face new
legal challenges.
Neither Illinois nor California’s school zone law exempts licensed
gun carriers; thus, those statutes are currently more restrictive than the
192
federal version. In addition, the California law provides an exception
for when the person has obtained a restraining order and is in fear of
193
danger and only applies to firearms “capable of being concealed on
194
The Illinois law, on the other hand, appears more
the person.”
restrictive and has fewer exceptions than either the California or federal
195
law. Not only does the Illinois statute establish similar 1000-foot gunfree perimeters around public parks, courthouses, public transportation
facilities, and public housing projects, but the only exceptions it allows
to these prohibitions are for law enforcement and school security
196
officers as well as students who have school permission.
Other states provide varying levels of regulations on gun possession
on school grounds. A few states have no statutes criminalizing firearms
on or near school grounds or they have laws that sanction firearm
possession by an extremely limited group of adults or only for certain
197
purposes on school grounds. More common are general prohibitions
“shall issue” laws—many of them passed in the 1980s and 1990s, where permits to carry
concealed handguns are not issued on subjective standards; in the forty-eight states that issue
permits to carry concealed weapons, the expectation is that the permits are valid throughout
the states with only a few exceptions. Id.
191. See State Firearms Laws Are Taking a Radical, Dangerous Turn, supra note 29.
192. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011), and 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(1)–(1.5) (West 2010), with Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
§ 1702(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2) (2006).
193. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(c)(3).
194. See id. § 626.9(c)(2).
195. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(2)–(3), with 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2),
and CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9.
196. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(2)–(3), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(2)(b) (allowing exceptions for private property not part of school grounds, approved
school programs, an individual acting in accordance with a contract between the school and
the individual, and law enforcement officers acting in an official capacity), and CAL. PENAL
CODE § 626.9(m)–(o) (allowing exceptions for authorized security guards, existing shooting
ranges on a school campus, and authorized honorably-retired peace officers).
197. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-72(c) (LexisNexis 2005) (prohibiting possession with
intent to do bodily harm of a firearm on public school grounds); ALASKA STAT.
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on loaded firearms within schools or at school-sanctioned events.
These laws assign differing levels of knowledge, exemptions, and
199
penalties to the criminal possession of firearms on school grounds.
California and Illinois are the only remaining states that establish 1000foot perimeters around school grounds on which the vast majority of
citizens could not legally transport loaded firearms while on public
property, although some states establish 1000-foot zones for the purpose
200
of forbidding unpermitted users from being near schools.
Both
§ 11.61.195(a)(2)(A) (2010) (penalizing possession of firearms by felon on school grounds or
adjacent parking lots); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-5-704, 76-10-505.5 (LexisNexis 2008)
(forbidding non-licensed firearm possessors on school grounds). Many statutes also allow
individual schools to decide whether to permit individuals to carry loaded weapons on school
grounds. See infra note 200. The superintendent of a Texas school district that allows guns in
its schools justified this position by saying, “to say that the only people who can protect
themselves have to [have] a badge . . . that’s just ludicrous.” See Stacy Teicher Khadaroo,
School Shootings: In Nebraska, a Proposal to Arm Teachers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan.
19,
2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Education/2011/0119/School-shootings-InNebraska-a-proposal-to-arm-teachers.
198. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-119
(1997); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-105.5 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217b (West
2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3302D (2004); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-47-9-2 (LexisNexis 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.4B (West 2003); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4204 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.070 (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV.
STAT ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6552 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-102 (LexisNexis 2002);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10(j) (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.237a(4)
(West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.66 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9737-17 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.030 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 281204.04 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.265 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:39-5(e) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2.1 (2004); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 265.01 (Consol. 2000 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.2 (2009); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-05 (2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1277 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 912 (West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-420, -430 (2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-7 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1309 (2010); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4004 (2009);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.280 (West 2010); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-11a (LexisNexis 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(t) (2011).
199. See statutes cited supra note 198.
200. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1442, 1457 (2007) (defining permitted users as law
enforcement and security officials, students possessing a deadly weapon as part of a course
instruction, people possessing the weapon as a part of recreational or sporting activity, and
those with a weapon within a private residence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.115 (West 2007)
(providing that permitted gun holders include individuals within 1000 feet of a school that
carry firearms when enrolled in school-approved programs or classes, are on an on-campus
firearm training range, store a weapon in a vehicle in a manner consistent with school policy,
or are law enforcement officers, but criminalizing the unlawful discharge of these weapons
within the gun-free zone); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011)
(prohibiting firearm possession by licensed carriers in schools but not within 1000 feet of
school property).
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Wisconsin and Louisiana had school zone laws similar to California and
Illinois’ until state lawmakers recently amended their state statutes to
permit individuals who had been given concealed carry licenses to
201
possess their weapons within the 1000-foot zone.
202
203
The unique school zone laws in California as well as in Wisconsin
204
(before the Wisconsin state legislature’s recent revision) drew legal
205
opposition following the Court’s Heller decision. The legal challenge
to Wisconsin’s former school zone statute that had been pending in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin alleged that the
law “covers such a broad area that it practically forecloses a meaningful
206
right to keep and bear arms in large parts of the state.” For example, a
map depicting the approximate locations of school zones in Milwaukee
207
covered the majority of the city, including a gas station where one of
208
The
the plaintiffs allegedly was arrested for violating the statute.
plaintiffs and other members of Wisconsin Carry, Inc. said that they
“desire to exercise their state and federal constitutional rights to bear
arms but are in fear of doing so because they live, work, and spend
209
leisure time within 1000 feet of schools.”
One of the plaintiffs, who
was planning an “open carry picnic” at his home in Greenfield,
Wisconsin, where attendees would be encouraged to carry firearms
201. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2; WIS. STAT. § 948.605 (2009–2010); Ed
Anderson, Bills to Stop Contractors Who Bribe Are Now Law - Measures to Fight Public
Corruption, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 8, 2010, at A2 (describing different laws
signed by Governor Jindal, including a change to gun-free school zones); Jason Stein,
Concealed Weapons Bill Signed; State Law to Take Effect in November; Effect on Safety Still
Debated, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 10, 2011, at B1 (noting the governor’s signing of gun
bill that included eliminating penalty for concealed carry permit holders within school zones).
Interestingly, the Louisiana amendment was enacted the day after another firearm
restriction—a prohibition on carrying guns in places of worship—was curbed with the signing
of a law that allows concealed weapons in houses of worship as part of security efforts. See
Ed Anderson & Jan Moller, ‘Gun-in-Church’ Bill Is Signed into Law by Jindal - It Goes into
Effect on Aug. 15, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 7, 2010, at A2.
202. CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011).
203. WIS. STAT. § 948.605 (2009–2010).
204. See 2011 Wis. Act 35, §§ 91–96.
205. See supra note 26 and sources cited therein.
206. Wisconsin Carry Complaint, supra note 26, at 8.
207. Id.
208. See id. In its response to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the City of Milwaukee and Kurt
Kezeske denied that plaintiff Bernson had been arrested for possession of a handgun within
1000 feet of a school. See Answer of Defendants City of Milwaukee and Kurt Kezeske to
Amended Complaint at 5, Wisconsin Carry, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, No. 2:10-cv-9-CNC
(E.D. Wis. Mar. 23, 2010).
209. Wisconsin Carry Complaint, supra note 26, at 8.
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lawfully and unconcealed, was allegedly warned regarding his event in a
210
letter from the city’s chief of police.
The chief of police allegedly
cautioned that the “property is barely 50 feet outside of a school zone.
Any picnic attendee straying into the school zone while armed risks
211
arrest and prosecution.”
In the California case, a San Francisco man brought a lawsuit
questioning the constitutionality of his state’s school zone law after local
school officials refused to give him permission to carry a firearm near an
212
elementary school.
Software programmer Kevin Hall, who lived
213
within 1000 feet of a school and represented himself in the case,
asserted in his lawsuit that he wished to carry the weapon for self214
defense, which was the crux of the Supreme Court’s decision in
215
Heller. But Hall’s statements to a local blogger cast doubt on his true
reasons for filing the lawsuit after being rejected by the school. Hall
stated that “[i]f they had said, ‘You can do it,’ [he] probably wouldn’t be
216
interested.” A federal court rejected Hall’s challenge in March 2011,
finding that the burdens the school zone law imposed on him were not
217
The court
great enough to implicate his Second Amendment rights.
reasoned, “[T]he law has no impact on Hall’s right to possess a handgun
at home or on any other private property. Hall also is not restricted
from carrying a firearm in a school zone in a locked container or in the
218
locked trunk of a car.”
B. The Second Amendment Protection for an Individual’s Right to Carry
a Loaded Weapon Within 1000 Feet of a School
Looking to Heller and McDonald for guidance, the first issue that
courts must consider when determining if a law violates an individual
right protected by the Second Amendment is whether the challenged
219
restriction implicates a core constitutional right.
In evaluating the
210. Id. at 6–7.
211. Id. at 7.
212. See Complaint at 4–5, Hall v. Garcia, No. CV10-3799 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010).
213. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 17, 2011); Smith, supra note 26.
214. See Complaint at 1, Garcia, No. CV10-3799.
215. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).
216. Smith, supra note 26.
217. See Garcia, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *14–16.
218. Id.
219. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958, 958–59 (2011).
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scope of the right protected by the Second Amendment, the Third
Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella parsed the text and structure of
the Heller decision, finding that the Court intended to “protect[] the
right of law-abiding citizens to possess non-dangerous weapons for selfdefense in the home” along with the right of citizens to possess firearms
220
for purposes that were lawful pre-ratification. The three-judge panel
of the Third Circuit, however, fell short in applying this understanding
to whether the Second Amendment protected defendant Michael
Marzzarella’s right to possess a handgun with an obliterated serial
221
number. While finding that unmarked firearms are not protected as a
class of weaponry by the Second Amendment, the panel determined
that the right to possess a handgun with an obliterated serial number
222
could still deserve constitutional protection.
The court reasoned in
favor of this possibility “because [the defendant’s] possession of the
Titan pistol in his home implicates his interest in the defense of hearth
223
and home—the core protection of the Second Amendment.” But the
panel ultimately left unanswered the question of whether such
possession actually is protected, stating that Marzzarella’s challenge
would fail anyway because the government’s restriction would survive
the court’s evaluation under an intermediate scrutiny standard of
224
review.
In United States v. Chester, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit
determined that individuals convicted of misdemeanor domestic
225
violence retain their Second Amendment rights.
In doing so, the
panel distinguished misdemeanants from felons, whom the Court in
Heller and McDonald singled out in their exemption from Second
Amendment protections, and evaluated the historical foundations of the
226
law at issue.
Although the panel found “inconclusive” the historical
evidence that prohibitions on felons possessing firearms were a
“founding era understanding,” it also determined that such prohibitions
were at least more longstanding than the federal law applying to persons
227
The panel remanded the case to the
convicted of misdemeanors.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92.
See id. at 95.
See id. at 94–95.
Id. at 94.
See id. at 95.
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680–82 (4th Cir. 2010).
See id. at 676–77.
Id. at 680–81. The court noted that the federal law dispossessing felons of firearms
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district court so that the government could submit arguments, under an
intermediate scrutiny standard, that a reasonable fit exists between the
228
law and a “substantial” governmental objective.
The first stage of applying this kind of analysis to school zone
statutes requires determining whether these laws implicate a lawful
229
purpose protected by the Second Amendment.
It is necessary to
evaluate the laws using this approach because the laws do not appear to
be protected as a category based on their historical underpinnings or
230
longstanding legal roots. The laws have only been in place for twenty
years and, therefore, lack the “historical justification” that earned the
231
Court’s blessing in Heller.
At least one court has deemed school zone laws presumptively legal
232
due to Heller’s list of exceptions. But that might have been a mistake.
Although the Supreme Court specifically included schools as examples
of “sensitive places” where laws forbidding the possession of firearms
233
would be considered “presumptively lawful,” it is not clear whether
the Court intended to include areas near such sensitive places within its
list, as would be required to protect the 1000-foot radius of the gun-free
school zones. The Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald used the
234
preposition “in” when referring to schools, as opposed to using
“around” or “near” (words that might have provided better
constitutional protection to the 1000-foot perimeter established by the
California and Illinois laws).
Of course, that is not to say that the Court might not have
considered the area immediately outside of a school to be a sensitive
place. If a school is a proper place from which firearms could
has existed “in some form or another since the 1930s.” Id. at 681.
228. Id. at 683.
229. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
230. See supra notes 165–73 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, there
are some historical groundings for some of the restrictions placed on firearms for some of the
“sensitive places” considered by the Court. See Larson, supra note 52, at 1378–79. Professor
Carlton F.W. Larson points out that a Missouri law that made it illegal to carry a firearm into
a school was upheld by that state’s Supreme Court in 1886. Id.
231. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
232. See United States v. Lewis, 50 V.I. 995, 1000–01 (2008). The court declined to enter
into a discussion about what level of scrutiny should apply. Id. Instead, it stated, “It is
beyond peradventure that a school zone, where [the defendant] is alleged to have possessed a
firearm, is precisely the type of location of which Heller spoke. Indeed, Heller unambiguously
forecloses a Second Amendment challenge to that offense under any level of scrutiny.” Id.
233. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 626–27 & n.26.
234. Id. at 626; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).
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constitutionally be kept from entering, then it is likely that the public
sidewalk just outside that school, which the schoolchildren entering and
exiting the schools have to traverse, also could be considered sensitive.
And, certainly, the Court was aware of the existence of laws
235
criminalizing the possession of firearms near schools.
But this
question—to where such a sensitive zone extends and whether a 1000foot perimeter can be justified in light of the burden it imposes on
individuals’ Second Amendment rights—is more properly considered as
part of a court’s standard of scrutiny review in the second part of this
inquiry.
Therefore, in evaluating whether the laws implicate a lawful
purpose, it is important to start by noting that the school zone laws
exempt the transportation of firearms within the 1000-foot perimeter
236
that are (1) unloaded and encased, (2) for target practice on school
237
shooting grounds, (3) carried by law enforcement or school security
238
239
officers, (4) allowed with the consent of school authorities, or (5) on
240
private property not part of school grounds. Additionally, Illinois’ law
241
includes a provision that exempts carrying firearms for hunting, and
California exempts individuals who believe they are in grave danger
242
from someone against whom they have a court order. The California
law also requires that an individual knows, or reasonably should know,
243
that he is in a school zone to support a conviction. As such, the most
likely challenge to a school zone law in any of these jurisdictions would
probably center on whether the law interferes with the need for
immediate self-defense in a public place. It is arguable whether the
235. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *12–13
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (stating the Heller Court “was certainly cognizant” of the federal
gun-free school zone law and its criminal penalties for firearm possession within 1000 feet of
schools).
236. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 § 1702(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(iii)
(2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(c)(2) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3) (West 2010).
237. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(iv) (permitting firearm use by individuals in schoolapproved programs); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(n); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3).
238. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(vi); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(m)–(o); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3).
239. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(v); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(b); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3).
240. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(B)(i); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(c)(1).
241. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3).
242. CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(c)(3).
243. Id. § 626.9(b).

HETZNER-13.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

394

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

11/28/2011 1:17 PM

[95:359

Court provided such protection in Heller or McDonald.
Central to the Court’s holding in both Heller and McDonald was the
244
protection of the individual right to self-defense in one’s own home,
which is still protected in school zone laws by the exemption of their
245
application to private property outside of school grounds.
The laws
also allow the carrying of firearms within the gun-free zones, so long as
246
the weapons are unloaded and encased. What a plaintiff likely would
have to argue, then, is that the ban on loaded firearms on public
property within 1000 feet of school grounds infringes on an individual’s
right to defend oneself in public by requiring individuals to travel for
brief times within the zones with unloaded and encased firearms.
Although unloading and placing into a case a handgun that one wishes
to carry in public might constitute a burden, it is not clear that this is a
burden on a constitutional right that has thus far been recognized by the
Supreme Court. Both the Heller and McDonald decisions focus on
restrictions on the use of handguns in the home, where, the Heller
majority states, “the need for defense of self, family, and property is
247
most acute.”
It would be a misreading of the Court’s cases, however, to limit their
holdings to protect an individual’s right to possess a handgun solely on
one’s own property. The overwhelming thrust of the majority’s concern
248
was on the ability of firearms to be used for self-defense.
To the
Court, the fact that the challenged laws in both cases extended to one’s
home simply underscored the extent of their infringement upon this
249
right. Indeed, the fact that the Court found the need to declare that
bans on weapons in sensitive places such as government buildings and
schools were permissible shows that it foresaw the potential extension of
250
the Second Amendment right to public places. However, the Court’s
244. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010); District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008).
245. See Stein, supra note 201. This, of course, would not extend to Illinois residents
who live in public housing, where the state law also prohibits firearm possession. See 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(1.5)–(2).
246. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(c)(2); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(3).
247. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
248. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3048; Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (stating self-defense “was
the central component of the right itself”).
249. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3105; Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
250. See Larson, supra note 52, at 1384 (noting that “if the right has little applicability
outside the home, there would be no need for the Court to single out ‘sensitive’ places, as
opposed to places outside the home more generally”).
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limitation on such public possession of firearms should not have a
bearing on whether the Court recognized a right to possess a weapon in
public for the purpose of self-defense. Such restrictions are more
properly evaluated under the prong of this two-part test that employs
different possible standards of review to see whether they are
251
constitutionally valid.
Thus, it is likely the Court established in Heller and McDonald that
the right to possess a firearm for purposes of self-defense extended
outside of the home to public places and that the 1000-foot perimeter
established by the school zone acts implicates this right.
C. Gun-Free School Zone Laws’ Chances of Surviving Challenges Based
on Different Levels of Scrutiny
The problem for courts in evaluating the school zone acts then
would likely boil down to which level of scrutiny to employ to analyze
the laws’ constitutionality. One district court that examined the federal
Gun-Free School Zones Act failed to even consider this question, much
like the Heller majority, determining the Court “foreclose[d] a Second
Amendment challenge” to laws forbidding the possession of a firearm in
252
a school zone “under any level of scrutiny.”
The district court that
examined the California law also did not confine itself to determining
253
the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply or even, for that matter, to
whether school zone laws should be considered categorically
254
constitutional.
Because the courts declined to analyze the law using
any level of scrutiny, determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to use
in such cases remains open for another court.

251. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958, 958–59 (2011); United
States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010);
Gould, supra note 92, at 1562–64.
252. Compare United States v. Lewis, 50 V.I. 995, 1000–01 (2008) (stating that “Heller
unambiguously forecloses a Second Amendment challenge to that offense under any level of
scrutiny”), with Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (noting “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny
that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most
preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,’
would fail constitutional muster” (internal citations omitted)).
253. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *14 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 2011).
254. See id. at *5–9.
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1. Strict Scrutiny
Employing strict scrutiny in considering whether the existing school
zone laws violate the Second Amendment protection of an individual’s
right to bear arms requires, first, an analysis of whether the government
255
has a “compelling interest” to support the enactment of the laws. A
compelling interest requires the government to show it had “an
256
extremely important reason” for enacting the law. Second, the law in
question must be examined as to whether it is “narrowly tailored” to
257
serve that interest. This requires a law to be so limited that it neither
restricts a constitutional right unrelated to advancing the government
258
interest, nor omits restrictions on rights related to that interest. Strict
scrutiny is often seen as “fatal” to any law that implicates a
259
constitutional right deserving of its protection, and its application to
most gun-control laws would likely produce a similar result.
As evidenced by the records available when the school zone laws
were passed, the laws were driven by a desire to protect children and
260
other innocent residents from violence and even death. In addition to
protecting the physical well-being of students and staff, measures taken
to prevent violence on school campuses can prevent a negative
261
educational environment.
Furthermore, laws governing criminal
activity and education have traditionally been viewed as the
262
responsibility of the states. This likely would support the states’ ability
to demonstrate a compelling interest in exercising their police powers in
the enactment of school zone legislation.
Yet, although such gun-control laws might be shown to serve a

255. See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 103, at 85–86.
256. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 694–95.
257. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 691, 727.
258. See Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232 (1987).
259. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 671; Winkler, supra note 34, at 727.
260. See 87th GEN. ASSEMB., H.R. TRANSCRIPTION DEBATE 143, 145 (Ill. June 18,
1992) (statement of Rep. Laurino); 136 CONG. REC. 1165 (1990) (statement of Sen. Herb
Kohl).
261. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS & BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2010, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter INDICATORS OF
SCHOOL CRIME & SAFETY] (stating that victimized children “[i]n addition to experiencing
loneliness, depression, and adjustment difficulties . . . are more prone to truancy, poor
academic performance, dropping out of school, and violent behaviors” and that, “[f]or
teachers, incidents of victimization may lead to professional disenchantment and even
departure from the profession altogether” (citations omitted)).
262. See Chamberlin, supra note 28, at 306.
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compelling government interest, many would likely fail to survive the
second prong in the analysis requiring that they be narrowly tailored to
serve that interest. Demonstrating the efficacy of gun-control laws,
263
necessary to support an argument of narrow tailoring, is difficult.
Indeed, as many commentators have pointed out, in recent years the
District of Columbia had one of the worst homicide rates in the country
264
despite also having one of the most restrictive gun-control laws. Gunrights proponents argue that a further distribution of weaponry among
law-abiding citizens in the country also might serve to reduce gun
265
violence against innocent people, not increase it. This viewpoint has
266
been disputed, however.
Moreover, although homicides of youths between five and eighteen
years of age and serious violent incidents against students who are
twelve through eighteen years of age have declined at schools since
267
1992, so have homicides and violent incidents off of school grounds.
And there is no indication that the states that instituted the 1000-foot
gun-free perimeters have been any more effective in reducing violent
268
school incidents than other states.
Thus, not only have other states
determined that they can achieve the goal of reducing school violence
through less restrictive means than establishing gun-free zones outside
of their schools in which otherwise law-abiding citizens could not carry
loaded firearms, they have not experienced any worse results than the

263. See Rosenthal & Malcolm, supra note 103, at 86.
264. Id. at 105 (noting that a study comparing the District of Columbia to forty-nine
other major cities found the District’s homicide rate was “substantially higher” than the rates
for the other cities after the 1976 handgun ordinance was passed).
265. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND
GUN CONTROL LAWS 323–24 (3d ed. 2010); Kopel, supra note 95, at 536–46; Rosenthal &
Malcolm, supra note 103, at 105–06. Following the killing of an assistant principal and
wounding of a principal by a student, a Nebraska lawmaker introduced a bill that would allow
teachers to carry concealed guns in schools. See Khadaroo, supra note 197. Similar proposals
in Arizona, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin were unsuccessful. Id.
266. See, e.g., Charles C. Branas et al., Investigating the Link Between Gun Possession
and Gun Assault, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2034, 2037 (2009) (finding in a Philadelphia-based
study that individuals who carried guns were more likely to be deliberately shot by someone
else than those who did not carry guns).
267. See INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME & SAFETY, supra note 261, at 88 tbl.1.1, 90
tbl.2.1.
268. See id. at 97 tbl.4.2. Although Wisconsin high school students reported being
subject to fewer violent incidents and threats of violence than the national average in 2009,
the percentage of Wisconsin students who reported being subject to such incidents or threats
rose between 2003 and 2009 while the national average dropped. Id. at 90 tbl.2.1, 97 tbl.4.2.
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269

states that have established such perimeters.
In addition to the challenges to their efficacy, the school zone laws
likely would face arguments that they are overinclusive in their effect on
an individual’s right to self-defense in public places. By granting only a
few exceptions, the laws could be shown to inconvenience and even
infringe upon the rights of those who wish to carry firearms in public for
270
protection. This right is not to be taken lightly. For example, a lawsuit
filed in New Jersey featured plaintiffs seeking to possess firearms for
self-defense, including a store owner who alleged he was mistakenly
kidnapped and subsequently threatened by members of the Hell’s
271
Angels motorcycle gang and a civilian employee of the Federal
Bureau of Investigations who was warned of a threat from members of
272
an Islamic fundamentalist group.
Given these problems with the effectiveness and overinclusiveness of
the school zone laws, proponents of the gun-free school zones,
therefore, are likely to encounter problems in showing that the laws are
narrowly tailored enough to meet the requirements of a strict scrutiny
standard of review.
But strict scrutiny is not necessarily the standard of review that will
be employed by courts in evaluating challenged laws. The Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Emerson, for example, used a test more akin to a
273
“reasonable basis” test than strict scrutiny.
Despite finding an
individual right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment,
the court upheld a federal law prohibiting anyone under a restraining
274
order from possessing a firearm. Indeed, even when courts profess to
employ strict scrutiny, they may in fact be relying on a lesser standard
than is commonly understood to protect fundamental constitutional
275
rights. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how the laws would stack
269. See id. at 97 tbl.4.2.
270. See supra notes 192–96. The only exceptions to the Illinois and California school
zone laws are for certain exceptional circumstances such as for law enforcement officers and
people who have been specifically allowed by schools to carry firearms or for certain
enumerated circumstances. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(2)–(3) (West 2010). Neither exempts widely permitted
carriers. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-1(c)(2)–(3).
271. See Complaint for Deprivation of Civil Rights Under Color of Law at 6–8, Muller v.
Maenza, No. 2:10-cv-06110-WHW-CCC (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2010).
272. See id. at 8–9.
273. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 691.
274. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001).
275. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 728–30 (evaluating cases where courts, in applying
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up against the other standards of review such as intermediate scrutiny
and rational-basis tests.
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
In applying intermediate scrutiny to examine the school zone laws in
California and Illinois, a court would examine whether the laws are
276
“substantially related to an important governmental objective.”
As
already discussed, the important government objective likely to be
advanced in defense of the laws would be protecting the states’
citizens—and, specifically, innocent children who are mandated to
277
attend schools for a certain number of years—from gun violence. This
is well within a state’s interests, which include providing a public
education as well as deterring and preventing criminal activity against its
278
citizens.
The question of whether the laws are “substantially related” to this
mission is a less stringent standard than strict scrutiny’s “narrowly
279
tailored” requirement.
Thus, questions of the challenged laws’
efficacy, which can demonstrate or disprove that the laws have been
narrowly tailored to achieve a solution, are not likely to play as
important a role as they would in an inquiry employing strict scrutiny.
Instead, a court probably would look to evidence that the government
could present to show that the law forbidding individuals from carrying
loaded firearms within 1000 feet of schools is substantially related to its
interest in protecting school children and other people on school
campuses from being violently injured or killed. Indeed, this interest
was cited by the California district court that dismissed the challenge to
280
that state’s school zone law.
As would also probably occur in a less-deferential strict scrutiny
review, there might be some debate about whether such a perimeter is
necessary, given that many other states simply forbid the possession of
weapons on school grounds, and whether there is a reason for setting
1000 feet as the limit instead of 500 or 2000 feet. But a court is likely to
defer to the government’s judgment that the zone is necessary for
strict scrutiny to gun-control laws, have possibly watered down the standard).
276. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
277. See supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text.
278. See Chamberlin, supra note 28, at 306–08.
279. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 88, at 671; Winkler, supra note 34, at 691.
280. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *14 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 2011).
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protection and substantially related to its well-established interest in
281
preventing violence against minors. Therefore, it is probable that the
282
laws could survive a review based on intermediate scrutiny.
3. Reasonable or Rational Basis
Lastly, even though Justice Scalia rejected application of a rational283
basis test in his majority opinion for the Heller case, a court still might
284
apply such a test—albeit under a different name. Indeed, the Fourth
Circuit accused other courts that treated the Heller dicta as a “safe
285
harbor” for certain laws as engaging in a type of rational-basis review.
Professor Adam Winkler also points out that the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Emerson, while seemingly applying a sort of strict scrutiny test
in calling for “narrowly tailored” exceptions to a Second Amendment
right, ended up permitting “reasonable” restrictions and a much lower
286
standard level of review.
A rational-basis test under any name would call for a court to simply
analyze whether a law is justified by advancing a “legitimate state
287
interest.”
Undoubtedly, a court easily could be persuaded that the
government has a legitimate interest in protecting school children and
others on school campuses from the potential dangers posed by loaded
288
firearms. That such firearms can be discharged from 1000 feet away
and injure a child or another person on school property could be found
to justify the government’s imposition of such a gun-free zone around
289
schools.
281. See id.
282. But see Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1318–19 (M.D. Ga.
2011) (finding it unclear whether the government’s interest in preventing crime is
substantially related to a law that prohibits the possession of firearms in church under an
intermediate scrutiny approach).
283. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008).
284. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 690–91 (noting a court decision that mixed the
language of strict scrutiny with that of reasonableness review).
285. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2010).
286. See Winkler, supra note 34, at 690–91.
287. See id. at 700.
288. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *14 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 2011) (“The government’s stated interest, of preventing harm to children, is
well-established as more than an important governmental objective. As the Supreme Court
has observed, ‘It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling.’” (quoting
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982) (internal citation omitted))).
289. According to the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, some bullets can travel up
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Alternatively, a court could evaluate the law under a slightly more
rigorous “reasonable regulation test,” which asks “whether the
challenged law is a reasonable method of regulating a right to bear
290
arms.” This type of test traditionally has been used by state courts to
evaluate laws challenged as violating the right to bear arms guaranteed
291
in most state constitutions. In addition to asking whether the school
zone laws serve a legitimate government interest, this test asks whether
292
the regulations the laws impose are reasonable.
This is still an
293
extremely deferential test, and the school zone laws likely would be
upheld as reasonable because they have some exceptions such as
allowing weapons on one’s own property or allowing weapons to be
carried, unloaded, and encased. These exceptions allow a person to
possess a firearm, just not in a readily usable capacity on public property
294
near a school.
Although Justice Scalia had concerns about such a
295
situation when a firearm is kept for self-defense in the home, carrying
a loaded weapon near a school is another matter altogether.
In sum, it is likely that even if a court were to find that Heller and
McDonald established an individual right for a person to carry a loaded
handgun in close proximity to a school, the only way that a school zone
law would not be held valid would be under a faithful strict scrutiny
approach. Thus, although most courts likely would uphold the laws
against legal challenges, the possibility exists that the laws could be
overturned by future courts.
V. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONE LAWS
Even though the school zone laws are likely to be struck down only
by a court using the highest standard of protection for a constitutional
right, legislators still should consider changes to their statutes. In the
years since the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act was passed, many
states have scaled back the law’s application without adverse effect

to five miles.
Firearms: Distances Bullets Travel, TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE,
http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/learning/hunter_education/homestudy/firearms/bullets.phtml (last
visited Oct. 18, 2011).
290. Winkler, supra note 34, at 717.
291. See id. at 716–17.
292. See id. at 717.
293. See id. at 718.
294. See Hall v. Garcia, No. C 10-03799 RS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34081, at *14 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 17, 2011).
295. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008).
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through expansion of the numbers of people legally allowed to carry
296
firearms. In most states, holders of valid permits are now allowed to
carry their weapons near, and sometimes even on, school grounds
297
without risk of penalty. In 2010, Louisiana amended its school zone
law to allow individuals with valid permits to carry concealed firearms
298
near schools, although not on school grounds.
The legislator who
sponsored the change argued it was necessary to allow gun owners to
carry their weapons while walking their dogs near schools or, for
residents who lived within 1000 feet of schools, from their homes to
299
their vehicles. Wisconsin enacted a similar change as part of a larger
bill passed in 2011 that established a licensing system under which
300
residents could legally carry concealed firearms, and thus the change
that eliminated the 1000-foot zones around schools did not get much
attention in the debate. Changing the state’s school zone law was
critical to gun advocates like Wisconsin Carry, however, which
advocated for a version of a concealed carry law most likely to limit the
301
importance of school zones.
Significantly, even though state laws have neutered the federal
school zone law to a certain extent, a provision penalizing the discharge
of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school still threatens punishment for
302
gun carriers whether licensed or not. That provision makes it unlawful
for a person to, “knowingly or with reckless disregard for the safety of
another,” discharge or attempt to discharge a firearm in a place that he
303
knows is a school zone. Exceptions are limited to people on private
property within the school zone, participants in certain schoolsanctioned activities, people who have received authorization from
school authorities, and law-enforcement officers acting in their official
296. Violent crimes against students in schools have fallen in recent years nationwide,
even with the passage of more permissive gun laws. See INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME &
SAFETY, supra note 261, at 90 tbl.2.1; State Firearms Laws Are Taking A Radical, Dangerous
Turn, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
297. See Kopel, supra note 95, at 519–21; State Firearms Laws Are Taking a Radical,
Dangerous Turn, supra note 29.
298. See Anderson & Moller, supra note 201.
299. See id.
300. See Stein, supra note 201.
301. See Gitte Laasby, Chief Slams Firearm Measure, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 3,
2011, at A1; Wisconsin Carry Urges Support of SB-93 As Amended, WISCONSIN CARRY, INC.
(May 24, 2011), http://www.wisconsincarry.org/default.html.
302. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 § 1702(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(3)(A)
(2006).
303. Id.
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capacities.
Unfortunately, the federal law includes the requirement
that the violator knows (or have reasonable cause to believe) that he is
305
in a school zone, an element that has caused problems for prosecutors
enforcing similar laws.
Although his case was not part of the lawsuit brought by Wisconsin
Carry in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
that challenged the state’s school zone law, twenty-three-year-old
Sheboygan Falls, Wisconsin resident Matthew Hubing’s experience
illustrates some of the reasons why legislators should eliminate the
knowledge aspect of the school zone laws. Hubing was arrested in May
2010, after he had strapped an unloaded rifle to his shoulder, holstered a
loaded handgun on his hip, mounted his bicycle, and pedaled to a
306
friend’s house.
On his way home, he was questioned by police,
eventually jailed for sixteen days, and charged with violating
307
The charges were later dismissed by a
Wisconsin’s school zone law.
308
Sheboygan County circuit court judge.
The first time the judge
dismissed the charges it was because Hubing was able to show that he
had been on private property and, therefore, was exempt from
309
prosecution under the law. Hubing was later recharged, but the judge
again dismissed the charges by ruling that prosecutors could not show
310
The cops’
Hubing knew he had transgressed into the school zone.
measurement put Hubing forty-six feet inside the 1000-foot perimeter
surrounding the school near his home; whereas Hubing’s calculation put
311
him outside of the zone. Both gun-rights advocates and a local district
attorney later said Hubing’s case exposed failings in the Wisconsin
312
law. But, while the district attorney focused on the limitations the law
posed for enforcement, the gun-rights advocate complained about its
313
potential implications for gun owners.
Nik Clark, president of
Wisconsin Carry, Inc., stated as follows: “That’s 46 feet between a
felony or not? That’s ridiculous. Are we going to send police with laser

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. § 922(q)(3)(B).
Id. § 922(q)(2)(A).
See Vielmetti, supra note 29; Personal Account of Matthew Hubing, supra note 29.
See Personal Account of Matthew Hubing, supra note 29.
See Vielmetti, supra note 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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314

measuring devices every time?”
Other alterations should be made to school zone laws—in addition
to removing the knowledge element from the California and federal
315
laws —to bring them into conformance with the emerging Second
Amendment jurisprudence. Despite the school zone laws’ success thus
far in withstanding legal assault, lawmakers should consider changes to
the laws in the interest of preserving the core protections of such
statutes and avoiding what could lead to protracted court battles.
Although politicians had important reasons for introducing the idea of
316
gun-free school zones in the early 1990s, the experience of the
majority of the states suggests that more modest measures can be as
317
effective in addressing the public’s concerns over school violence.
Indeed, as has been noted by others, some of the exceptions to the
existing gun-free school zone statutes have essentially rendered the
statutes useless in some areas. The federal government’s allowance for
individuals legally permitted to carry loaded weapons within the zones
318
has made having such zones nearly meaningless in most states.
The
requirement under both California and federal law of a knowing (or a
reason to believe) violation before a penalty is invoked makes those
statutes difficult to enforce. In addition, some states that want to allow
more citizens to legally carry firearms may have unwittingly expanded
the group of potential violators who could be nabbed for an
unpermitted transgression into a federal gun-free school zone and
319
charged with a felony. The politicians who favored these permissive
changes to the gun laws likely would endorse a different approach.
Those interested in strengthening the nation’s gun law should
consider changes to the school zone laws as well. Not only are the
school zone laws difficult to enforce because of the requirement that an
320
individual know he is in a school zone, the laws’ effectiveness is
becoming more and more hampered by the large number of states that

314. Id.
315. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 § 1702(b)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(3)(A)
(2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(b) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011).
316. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 1 (detailing schoolyard shootings that alarmed
lawmakers).
317. See supra notes 267–69, 296–98 and accompanying text.
318. See Kopel, supra note 95, at 518–19 (calling the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act
“irrelevant”); supra notes 206, 296–301.
319. See supra note 29.
320. See, e.g., Vielmetti, supra note 29.
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321

now allow residents to carry concealed firearms.
A compromise between those who want to allow citizens to carry
firearms in public for self-defense and those who want to protect
schoolchildren from the threat of violence posed by the public
possession of readily usable weapons, therefore, is in order. Such a
compromise can be reached by replacing the current school zone laws
with ones that make it unlawful only to fire a weapon or attempt to fire
322
a weapon within a 1000-foot radius of a school.
This would address
the greatest fear prompting such laws—that a firearm shot near a school
might harm a child or another person associated with that school—while
not implicating a person’s ability to carry or display such a weapon in a
lawful manner. As noted, the federal school zone law already has such a
provision in place, albeit with the requirement that the person knows he
323
is in a school zone, which has limited the effectiveness of the state
324
school zone laws.
A better law would be one that eliminates the requirement that a
person know he is within a school zone when he fires a weapon. In such
a case, the person who fires the gun can be held criminally liable even
without knowing, or reasonably knowing, that he is within 1000 feet of a
school. An exception should exist, as it does in the federal statute, for
when the person is on private property or has another reasonable
325
justification. Such limited circumstances should be enough to protect
an individual’s constitutional right to self-defense at home, without
implicating the rights of innocent others. In addition, the self-defense
argument also would be available to rebut charges in court for those
who fire or attempt to fire a weapon on public property within the 1000326
foot zone.
Because lack of knowledge would not be a defense for
321. See Stein, supra note 201 (noting that Wisconsin became the forty-ninth state in
July 2011 to allow citizens to carry concealed guns). After Wisconsin’s law was enacted,
Illinois became the only state to not permit the carrying of concealed weapons. See id.
322. Maine penalizes the discharge, but not the possession, of a firearm within 500 feet
of a school and prohibits possession on public school property but does not prohibit
possession within 500 feet of a school. See ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6552 (2008).
Minnesota makes it a crime to recklessly handle or intentionally point a firearm at another
within 300 feet of a school. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 152.01(14a), 609.66 (West 2009 & Supp.
2011). The change in Wisconsin’s law left intact a provision that makes it a felony to
discharge a firearm in a place that the person knows is within 1000 feet of a school. See WIS.
STAT. § 948.605(3) (2009–2010), amended by 2011 Wis. Act 35, §§ 91–96.
323. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(3)(A) (2006).
324. See id. § 922(q)(2)(A), (q)(3)(A).
325. See id. § 922(q)(3)(B)(i)–(iv).
326. A successful claim of self-defense requires a defendant to show he faced a “serious”
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others who are firing their weapons in public places, the new law could
have more teeth than what is currently in place with the federal and
California laws.
Although it could be argued that this change in the laws would tie
law enforcement’s hands when it comes to questioning and restraining
those with firearms who are near schools, the reality is that police are
likely enforcing the law after receiving notice of a prior incident
327
anyway. This would lead to little difference in how the law would be
enforced under the proposed change.
The new law would be well-positioned to withstand the scrutiny of
most courts. Even under a kind of heightened scrutiny, the new law’s
focus on the firing of guns near school grounds where innocent children
are likely to get hurt should convince a judge that the law has enough
focus and purpose to withstand a legal challenge. First, by restricting
the provisions that penalize simple possession of a firearm to a school
building or school grounds, the law clearly falls within Heller’s dicta that
explicitly endorsed laws that ban firearm possession in schools and
would be viewed as a narrow restriction tied to a significant government
328
interest. Second, by allowing firearms to be carried within the school
zone and only fired for certain limited exceptions, the law would still
protect an individual’s ability to possess a weapon that could be used for
a person’s self-defense in his home, which the Court found in Heller and
329
McDonald to be the core guarantee of the Second Amendment.
330
Even in the current vitriolic political climate, such a measure
and “imminent” threat of bodily harm and that this response was “necessary and
proportionate” to the harm faced. See V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2001).
327. See, e.g., Vielmetti, supra note 29; Christine Won, Man: Police Did Not Like Him
Openly Carrying, RACINE J. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2009), http://www.journaltimes.com/news/local/
article_cae54460-9f44-11de-8897-001cc4c03286.html; Personal Account of Matthew Hubing,
supra note 29. Police officers in Racine, Wisconsin, arrested Frank Hannan-Rock during
their response to a call that a shot had been fired and a man was reloading his handgun in the
street. When officers encountered Hannan-Rock openly carrying a gun in a holster on his
own front porch, Hannan-Rock refused to give them his name or address and was arrested.
See Won, supra; Letter from Michael E. Nieskes, Dist. Att’y, Racine Cnty, to Frank HannanRock (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.wisconsincarry.org/pdf/GFSZA_Legal_Documents/HannanRock_Racine-Letters.pdf; Letter from Michael E. Nieskes, Dist. Att’y, Racine Cnty., to
Frank Hannan-Rock (June 18, 2010), http://www.wisconsincarry.org/pdf/GFSZA_Legal_
Documents/Hannan-Rock_Racine-Letters.pdf.
328. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
329. See id. at 628–29; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048 (2010).
330. See Dan Balz, Debt Talks Show Breakdown in Governing, WASH. POST, July 24,
2011, at A1 (calling the 2011 political climate a “period of partisanship as intense as it has
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should garner broad support from politicians of different persuasions.
331
Indeed, in a state as divided as Wisconsin was in 2011, several
Democrats joined Republicans to support the passage of the law
332
allowing the concealed carrying of firearms. The problem likely would
lie in getting support from the gun lobby, which has successfully pushed
for a nationwide easing of restrictions on gun possession for the past two
333
decades.
On the other hand, one of the gun lobby’s most successful
arguments has been to distinguish the lawful possession of firearms from
334
their criminal use.
Limiting the school zone laws to the firing or
attempted firing of weapons near school grounds, rather than the
possession of firearms, might just pacify this powerful interest group.
VI. CONCLUSION
More than two decades after Laurie Dann and Patrick Purdy made
victims of dozens of innocent people in Illinois and California, another
lone gunman killed six people and wounded thirteen more in a
335
supermarket parking lot in Tucson, Arizona. Among the dead on that
336
day in January 2011 were a nine-year-old girl and a federal judge.
337
Among the wounded was a U.S. congresswoman. Public calls emerged
anew after the Tucson shooting for increasing, and in some cases even
338
restoring, firearm regulations.
Equally compelling reasons drove
339
school zone laws when they first were initiated in the early 1990s. But
the Court’s recent decisions endorsing an individual right to bear arms

been in many years”).
331. See Monica Davey, Recall Elections in Sharply Divided Wisconsin Are Ending on
Frenetic Note, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, at A11 (stating that Wisconsin is currently
experiencing “one of the most polarized, vitriolic political years in memory”).
332. See Jason Stein, Concealed Carry Bill Heads to Walker: Assembly Passes GOP Gun
Plan with Bipartisan Support, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 22, 2011, at A1 (noting that 11
Assembly Democrats voted for the bill that included changes to the state’s school zone law);
Press Release, Office of Wis. State Sen. Lena C. Taylor, Statement on
Conceal Carry Bill (June 9, 2011), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/senate/sen04/news/Press/2011/pr2
011-029.asp.
333. See State Firearms Laws Are Taking a Radical, Dangerous Turn, supra note 29.
334. See Laasby, supra note 301; State Firearms Laws Are Taking a Radical, Dangerous
Turn, supra note 29.
335. See Marc Lacey & David M. Herszenhorn, Congresswoman Is Shot in Rampage
near Tucson, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at 1.
336. See id.
337. See id.
338. See, e.g., Editorial, Saner Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at WK9.
339. See supra Parts I, IV.A.
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should prompt states to consider changes to existing laws that prevent
the carrying of loaded firearms within 1000 feet of school grounds.
Although such laws could withstand most legal challenges, policymakers
should pursue reforms to head off any problems while improving the
laws in the process. Such laws are especially vulnerable should the
Court determine that the ability to carry a weapon for self-defense on
public property near schools is a right guaranteed by the Constitution
340
and that any law to the contrary must pass a strict scrutiny test.
The California and federal school zone laws also are currently
hampered in their application by requiring knowledge on the part of
341
armed individuals who enter the zones to be successfully prosecuted.
A change that allows prosecution of individuals who fire weapons within
public places in these zones, without providing an exception for whether
they knew of their presence within the zone, would likely serve many of
the same goals of the original legislation while surviving even the closest
look by the courts.
Policymakers need to do what they can to try to ensure that what
Laurie Dann and Patrick Purdy did will not occur again. But lawmakers
also need to evaluate the effectiveness of legislation passed in the
emotion of a moment and adapt the laws to the evolving conception of
the Second Amendment.
AMY HETZNER

340. See supra Part IV.C.1.
341. See Stein, supra note 201; Vielmetti, supra note 29.
* J.D. anticipated May 2012, Marquette University Law School.
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